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Book Reviews
TAX LAWS OF MI\ARYLAND, ANNOTATED, Second Edition.
Compiled and Edited by Huntington Cairns. Baltimore.
State Tax Commission of Maryland 1937. Pp. xviii, 516(Paper or Cloth).
Perhaps the first scholarly approach to the Maryland
system of taxation was made by the Tax Revision Commis-
sion, under Arthur W. Machen, Esq., in .1928. As a result
of its labors a new tax statute was enacted the following
.year. The effort was to bring all the tax laws into one
article of the Code and to achieve at least a working con-
sistency and harmony among the different provisions. No
attempt was made to change the broad general lines of the
taxing system.
But tax laws refuse to stay in the orderly compartments
in which commissions, from time to time, arrange them.
Before long Federal coercion produced the Maryland Estate
Tax, which was enacted as a new article of the Code.
Emergency relief problems demanded emergency revenues,
and sales or gross receipts taxes, taxes on recorded instru-
ments, direct inheritance taxes and now an income tax have
been the subject of recent experiment. Thus, a compilation
of the tax laws of today meets a two-fold need: First, the
need for an authoritative guide to the statute law as re-
vised by the 1928 Commission, and second, the need for ar-
rangement of the wealth of new material in its proper set-
ting and perspective.
These ends have been admirably achieved by Mr. Cairns.
The State Tax Commission is to be congratulated upon
rendering a timely service to the bar and the public in ar-
ranging for the publication of this volume, and on its selec-
lion of Mr. Cairns as editor. His experience as a practi-
tioner in the field of corporate taxation and as a teacher of
taxation well equipped him for the task.
On first examining the volume, one is impressed with the
tremendous bulk of legal material now made available, much
of it for the first time. Cases construing the old law have
been retained and appear, with proper qualification, under
the corresponding sections of the 1929 revision. To these
have been added extensive references to rulings of the At-
torney General, cross-references, and other material which
might throw light on the proper construction of the law.
Notes showing the source and history of each section are
- provided. It is noteworthy that at least sixty percent addi-
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tional material appears in this edition as compared with
the previous one prepared by Mr. Cairns in 1936.
Despite the wealth of material one is reminded that maay
interesting questions still remain to be settled. Is the in-
come tax constitutional.? Mr. Cairns has discussed this
point in the last issue of the REVIEW. What is the exact
scope of review of assessments by the Courts I How can.
overassessment be attacked as a violation of the due-process
clause? What is a "franchise tax" under the Maryland
statute-is it a property tax on intangibles or a privilege
tax? To what extent is the gross receipts tax on utilities
(which is termed a "franchise tax") dependent on property
taxes? All the Maryland law on these and other questions
can be found in Mr. Cairns' book. Much litigation of vital
consequence to taxpayers may be anticipated, and the prac-
titioner will find the tasks of advising clients and preparing
litigation greatly simplified by use of this work.
This reviewer regrets that he is unable to single out any
feature of the compilation for adverse criticism which might
lead to improvement in a later edition. On the contrary, he
heartily recommends the present edition to the bar "as is".
It is, in his opinion, an essential part of the equipment of
every Maryland law office.
-HERBERT M. BRLTNE, JR."
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALI, TANEY AND
WAITE. By Felix Frankfurter. Chapel Hill. The Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1937. Pp. 114.
This slim volume embraces three delightfully written
essays, which should assume a deserved importance as lucid,
scholarly and entirely dispassionate contributions to Amer-
ican constitutional history. We think of the commerce
clause today as being primarily an instrument for the ex-
tension of Federal governmental power. But for the
greater part of its history, and up until the last fifty years,
it served almost entirely as a restriction upon the legislative
powers of the States, and it has not lost its importance from
that viewpoint. Its development in this respect by the
Supreme Court involved, as it does today, the reconciliation
of the conflicting claims of the States and the Federal gov-
ernment as well as the relationship between business and
government, and while the author in his introduction cau-
tions against regarding the Supreme Court as reflecting the
* Of the Baltimore City bar. Associate Professor of Law, University of
Maryland School of Law. Assistant Editor of the Rzvssw.
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views of any one judge, however great, yet the influence of
the three Chief Justices presiding over the Court during a
very large part of its history is an obvious one.
To Maryland readers, the author's discussion of Taney,
his doctrines and his effect upon the development of the
commerce clause will be of particular interest. It is a
thoughtful and sympathetic discussion and he pays a warm
tribute to "the intellectual power of his opinions and their
enduring contribution to a workable adjustment of the theo-
retical distribution of authority between two governments
for a single people." He places Taney second only to Mar-
shall in the constitutional history of our country and com-
ments upon the tragedy that his greatness as a judge has
beeir so long overshadowed by the storm aroused by the
Dred Scott decision.
The difference of viewpoint between Marshall and Taney
as to the extent to which the commerce clause operates to
impose restrictions upon state legislative and taxing au-
thority is developed with great'clarity and is in striking
contrast to the traditional explanation of a clash between
the adherent of a strong central government and the States'
rights man. The author points out that Taney's thesis as
laid down in The License Cases had history on its side.
In some ways, the essay on Waite is the most interesting
of the three. For here is a judge who lacked color, and in
whom the spark of genius, if present, flashed very dimly
behind a dull and matter-of-fact style. Contemporary opin-
ion regarded him as a safe and sound, but mediocre figure,
and the author is not over-successful in convincing the
reader that he was more. The impressive feature of his
work is found to lie not in the statesman-like quality of his
specific doctrines, but rather in his adherence to traditional
and conventional canons of constitutional adjudication and
review. One questions whether his influence upon the de-
velopment of constitutional doctrine deserves to be placed
in the same class as that of his great predecessors. For the
most part it seems a negative influence only, as Waite him-
self seems for the most part a negative figure. And in his
most famous opinion, that in Mutm v. Illinois, his unfor-
tunate generalization as to property affected with a public
interest brought difficulties only too familiar in its train.
These three essays deserve reading by every lawyer in-
terested in constitutional history.
-ROGER HowELL.
Dean and Professor of Law, Unlversity of Maryland Sebool of Law.
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How LAWYEnS THINK. By Clarence Morris. Cambridge.
The Harvard University Press, 1937. Pp. xiv. 144.
The reader should not miss the flattery of the profession
implicit in Professor Morris' title. It is comforting to have
assurance that lawyers need to think and do think. This
fairly interesting little book-written with the perspective
of the professional law teacher-is of a sort published more
frequently in recent years. These are books about the law
written so that laymen, as well as lawyers may have some
insight into what might vaguely be called "jurisprudence".
Whether such books be written by active practitioners
or judges or by members of the teaching branch of the pro-
fession is immaterial. Each side has much to learn from
the other. It is to be encouraged that those on either side
of the campus gates shall attempt to formulate ideas gleaned
from their immediate experiences, so that others may profit.
That the book under review does not quite reach the goal it
seeks is not to be blamed on defective execution so much as
on the impossibility of imprisoning on paper any descrip-
tion of how lawyers do think.
How lawyers think is something that cannot be taught
in law schools nor be written in books. The lawyer's mental
processes in working out the solution of a problem are de-
veloped by practice rather than learned as a method. The
technique of the adviser-advocate is an art rather than a
science.
The book under review is built around the idea of
problem solving. The lawyer's task is assumed to be that
of searching out the answer to a problem laid before him.
Despite Justice Holmes' famous dictum that experience, not
logic, is the life of the law, the emphasis throughout is on
logic and syllogisms. This makes for dull reading in spots,
although the writer's style is, generally, very readable.
This surfeit of logic seems unnecessary. Do lawyers use,
or need to use formal logic in their daily tasks? Certainly
not to the extent implicit in this book.
The type of lawyer who practices "by ear" will not use
a book of this sort. The one who conscientiously works up
the book law of all his cases will not need it. It is doubtful
that students will be able to follow it, at least until they
have progressed so far that they will not need it. Thus it is
that dissent must here be indicated from the enthusiastic
book-jacket blurb of the publishers to the effect that the
book may be well-nigh indispensable both to lawyers and
students.
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Despite the dullness inevitably resulting from the em-
phasis on logic, the book contains occasional passages that
stand out, in one or two instances where the writer is talk-
ing about how judges, rather than lawyers, think. The con-
clusion is, perhaps, superior to the other chapters. While
one can find little to quarrel with in the book itself, yet its
publication poses the question of the utility of logic in the
legal scene. Perhaps a better title would have been "How
Logic Minded Lawyers Think."
-- JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.*
Book Notes
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIoN. By William Draper
Lewis. Charlottesville. The Michie Company, 1937. Pp.
vi, 117.
A series of lectures delivered under the auspices of the
William H. White Foundation at the University of Virginia
Department of Law, in which are presented and analyzed
the function of the Supreme Court as an interpreter of the
Constitution, some of the factors which affect it in the per-
formance of that function, and some present problems of
constitutional interpretation confronting the Court. The
author emphasizes both in his foreword and conclusion, that
he is not seeking to advocate or to impose upon his readers
any particular constitutional doctrines, and wishes only to
present to them the problems discussed in order that they
may form their own opinions with respect thereto. In do-
ing so, he adheres strictly to this determination, to the ex-
tent indeed that it detracts somewhat from the undoubted
value of the book as a simple and clear, if somewhat elemen-
tary, exposition of the questions discussed. It is to be re-
gretted that the very full footnotes are collected at the end
of the book. This is a practice which is hardly to be com-
mended.
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Faculty
Editor of the ILEvmw.
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STATE HOUSE V. PENT HousE: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE
RHODE ISLAND RACE-TRACK Row. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
Providence. The Booke Shop, 1937. Pp. xxiv, 165.
This is a novel type of book, issued by Professor Chafee
of the Harvard Law School, and of the Rhode Island Bar,
and it treats of the late controversy between the Governor.
of Rhode Island and the manager of the Narragansett Race
Track which filled the columns of the newspapers in late
1937. The book is one of the Dorr Pamphlets, edited by
Mr. Chafee as "A Series of Discussions and Documents on
Rhode Island Affairs-Past, Present, and Future." The
immediate purpose of this one seems to have been to awaken
the people of Rhode Island to what a mess their affairs are
in and to stimulate them to do something about it. The
book is of unusual style. It contains the author's text, ex-
tensive documentation, a chronological survey of the activi-
ties of the principal actors, many illustrations of the race
track, of soldiers on duty thereat under martial law, of
newspaper headlines, and of other relevant facts. Each
chapter starts with a cogent quotation. The Appendix takes
half the book. The whole book makes interesting reading,
not only to students of the current scene, but to those inter-
ested in problems of administrative government and of
martial law. Students of criminal libel and of horse racing
will also find much of value in it.
